

USACE 2012

FUTURE CORPORATE AND HQ  
DESIGN STUDY

APPENDIX D: MISSION ASPECTS  
OF STRUCTURE

## **APPENDIX D – MISSION ASPECTS OF STRUCTURE**

### **Command and Control**

The United States Army Corps of Engineers enjoys a unique blend of talented military and civilian senior leadership. Military commanders lead organizations comprised of civilian employees. The military commanders also bring a unique blend of leadership skills and sense of urgency to accomplishing missions assigned by the Army and the Congress and the President under the laws of the United States. This mix of military and civilian talent is unique among Federal agencies engaged in water resource issues, and has served the Corps and the nation well.

But, the Corps of Engineers is a military organization. Its organizational structure reflects a military model that has evolved over more than 220 years. And the term “Command and Control” is an inherently Military term. At its most basic level, command and control refers to the way a Military Commander ensures success in accomplishing an assigned mission. Military officers command all USACE Districts, Divisions and Centers. Having military commanders responsible for USACE organizations has enhanced responsiveness and the reputation of the Corps of Engineers. Customers, stakeholders, partners, as well as civilian members of the Corps, understand the authority of military commanders and leverage that authority to deal with controversial issues.

Military commanders at all levels assume responsibility for accomplishing the mission once it is assigned. Oftentimes within USACE, missions are assigned based on some predetermined criteria, such as geographic area of responsibility. But, as subordinate commanders are given their respective pieces of the mission (in the form of mission statements), they assume responsibility for accomplishing their piece of the larger mission, which comes in the form of a new mission statement. And the inherent responsibility for accomplishing the mission influences much of the upward reporting requirement in USACE. Within the military culture, as subordinate commanders are assigned their mission, the preceding superior commander cannot abrogate his or her responsibility for accomplishment of the larger mission. The superior commander wishes to remain abreast of the overall progress in accomplishing the mission, and thus is established a requirement to report on progress. (The business world offers many other models, but rarely will you find the kind of operational progress reporting on the status of projects and programs that you find within USACE in the private sector. Also impacting the requirement for USACE upward reporting is the need to satisfy information requirements of Congress and the Administration.)

Ideally, the future USACE corporate design would rely less on issuing orders to accomplish the “mission,” and more on a sense of completing the business of the organization in the most efficient manner to attain corporate objectives.

District Commanders are ultimately responsible for accomplishing the mission, ie delivering high quality projects on time and within budget. But such project delivery

must accommodate the needs of the customer, and therefore relies on effective relationships to help the customer succeed. At all levels the approach of the Corps is broader than the individual project and focuses on the larger systemic world of the customer. The ultimate successful performance indicator is additional work and repeat business from delighted customers, because they want USACE to do their work, not because they are required to have USACE do their work. They come to realize that the Corps understands and helps them with their strategic success, and sees projects in that larger systems perspective.

Important aspects of the role of the USACE and MSC Commanders are to ensure that District Commanders have the necessary resources to accomplish their missions, remove roadblocks to their work, and facilitate success. Resources don't necessarily need to be assigned to the District Commander. They may be virtual, ie reside elsewhere in the region or in USACE and can be dedicated to the District Commander for the particular mission (in much the same way as a military Task Force is resourced to accomplish a tactical mission). This notion supports the concept of a Regional Business Center, in which mission success is measured as the collective success within the region, and resources are managed across the region to ensure individual mission accomplishment. Regional commanders should be concentrating on regional issues that exceed subordinate District boundaries, their relationships with their regional counterparts, with their Districts' customers, the quality and effectiveness with which projects are delivered to help customers succeed, and the ability of their Districts to accomplish the mission, as opposed to how quickly money is being expended to execute work.

In the ideal future environment, from a mission perspective, the following are considerations relative to command and control:

- How missions are interactively assigned, (who decides to whom they are assigned, are they assigned by geographic area, by program, by capability)?
- Are mission statements clear and concise (what is to be done, who will do it, when is it to be completed), allowing for learning during the process that requires changes and adjustments?
- What defines mission success? Are the metrics coproduced and do customers agree?
- How well has the District Commander organized the right people for the PDT and fully included the customers so that coproduction results from concept to completion?
- Are the right resources available to the District Commander, geographically present or virtually, to accomplish the mission?
- How well do regional commanders and the USACE Commander monitor performance for effectiveness and organizational learning? (The four PMBP

learning points are, in sequence: 1 – check best practices/innovations at project conception, 2 – mid-course learning and adjustment, 3 – AAR at completion, and 4 – enter the learning into the Learning Network System. There must be minimal interference with the District Commander in accomplishing the mission (the District Commander is responsible for determining how it should be done), following the shared value of empowerment.

- Other than establishing policy and providing resources, HQUSACE's main role in mission accomplishment is for strategic learning, what does this project tell us about the effectiveness of our strategy, and what must change in the future?
- The regional commander must be a facilitator and partner, setting the conditions for the districts to succeed.
- How can the regional MSC Commander be most helpful with respect to District customers?

### **Program Management**

Quoting from ER 5-1-11: “(Program Management) consists of the development, justification, management, defense and execution of programs within available resources, in accordance with applicable laws, policies, and regulations, and includes accountability and performance measurements. Program management takes project management to a greater level of interdependence and broadens the corporate perspectives and responsibilities.”

Programs can be defined in either of two ways:

1. A collection of projects with a single funding source.
2. A collection of projects at a single location (military installation, river basin, etc).

In both definitions, there is a customer who is either providing funding to accomplish a specific purpose, or who is the end user of the completed project. Project managers focus on the end users. Program managers focus on the resource providers and the project managers.

In the USACE hierarchy there is another class of customer, the internal organizational element assigned the mission to be executed. Thus HQUSACE has as a primary customer MSCs, and MSCs have Districts as their primary customer.

This duality of purpose, to support those providing resources or using the project, and to support those actually delivering the work that is done, is at the very heart of how USACE needs to organize itself from a program management perspective.

In the Military Construction Program, USACE involvement in program development is very limited. The vast majority of programming decisions are made in the Pentagon, at the military installation or with the Major Service Commands. USACE is an execution agent responsible for maintaining the technical capability to deliver program requirements. Resources pass from the Pentagon to HQUSACE to MSCs to the Districts. MSC involvement is simply as a pass-through office. In the case of installation support, resources pass from the installation directly to the District for execution. This may change with the recent creation of the Installation Management Agency, a Washington level command responsible for overseeing all installation management activities, but this is a work-in-progress. USACE must organize itself to most effectively accomplish program management given these realities.

In the Civil Works Program the program is developed by the Corps of Engineers in close coordination with local sponsors, stakeholders, members of Congress and the Administration. The ability to develop the Civil Works Program requires certain technical expertise and effective working relationships with customers and other stakeholders. The majority of this expertise is concentrated in the Planning arena. Planners know what policy exists regarding water resources development, what policy is required and how it is developed. Authority to accomplish Civil Works projects in support of the Nation comes from the electorate through the Congress. Resources (in the form of funding) come from Congress and the President in the form of the laws of the United States as well as from local sponsors. Congress plays a major role in helping local sponsors identify strategies to support local needs. USACE interacts at the Washington level with Congress and other Federal agencies with water resources related responsibilities. MSCs interact at the regional level with key members of Congress and Federal agency counterparts likewise engaged. Districts interact with local sponsors and state agencies charged with water resource responsibilities.

Program management is supposed to facilitate mission accomplishment. Program managers help accomplish the mission by providing needed resources. Therefore, program managers must be able to determine what the requirements are so they can be supported. Requirements are communicated through trust-based relationships and performance indicators.

At the HQUSACE level program managers are focused on major resource providers (Congress, the Air Force, FEMA, etc). These resource providers are their major customers. HQUSACE provides resources to the MSCs who are the regional mission implementers. In turn, the regional MSC provides resources and assistance to the Districts. Program managers at the MSC are focused on providing Districts the resources needed to accomplish the mission and generally knowing where those resources come from. Whether the resources are funding or technical capability, it is the Regional Business Center that is the first line of supply outside the District for the Districts

executing the mission. It is a primary function of the Regional Business Center to leverage resources across the region. The regional (MSC) commander also acts as a checkpoint or gauge for the success of mission accomplishment by interacting with regional interagency counterparts and with customers serviced by assigned Districts.

From a mission perspective, as the ideal future corporate design is implemented, program management must:

- Provide the customer regular, honest and transparent information (status of mission execution, program requirements).
- Co-design with customers how mission success is measured.
- Distribute funds across USACE to most efficiently satisfy program requirements.
- Leverage resources across the region.
- Distribute technical capability in order to develop water resources policy and program requirements in the Civil Works Program.
- Define how quality control of Civil Works programming documents is accomplished to facilitate execution.
- Define program management in the Military Construction Program and how it is best accomplished to facilitate mission execution.
- Quickly and accurately transmit information to support program development and execution.

### **National Interface (Strategic Relationships)**

In the context the term is used here, “National Interface” refers to interaction with agencies or organizations (stakeholders) that have responsibility for the management of programs affecting or involving the Nation as a whole. These agencies and organizations may be governmental (Federal Department level); professional (American Society of Civil Engineers, American Society of Consulting Engineers, Society of American Military Engineers, etc); special interest (American Rivers, Nature Conservancy, etc); international (foreign governments, agencies of foreign governments); or private.

While “National Interface” refers to interaction with agencies at the Washington, DC level, there are agencies and organizations with responsibility for managing National programs that reside outside the city of Washington, DC. It is one of four missions that have been assigned to HQUSACE. In some cases, national interface may occur at the

MSC level, such as Northwestern Division's US Entity responsibilities in the Canada-US Columbia River Treaty.

When implementing the ideal corporate design, the following are considerations concerning National Interface:

- HQUSACE retains responsibility for National Interface but in these and with other particular relationships, organizations or programs, strategic changes are worked interactively with subordinate headquarters.
- National Interface includes the development of policies and procedures that have impact on the ability of all of USACE to execute its missions. Interactive planning with field headquarters produces better policy and procedures on matters affecting execution.
- National Interface involves protocols and interaction at a level that usually doesn't exist outside HQUSACE.
- National Interface may entail the involvement of another governmental agency, for example, consulting with a foreign government on water resource matters may require coordination or interaction with the State Department.
- Interaction with another governmental agency may require coordination and approval of the Department of the Army or Department of Defense.
- National Interface requires careful consideration of the appropriateness of interaction with or without involvement of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works.
- National Interface is all about relationships. Developing these strategic relationships takes time. They are cultivated over an extended period. While the Chief of Engineers, the Deputy Chief of Engineers, or the Director of Military Programs or Civil Works may be the point person for contact with another agency, effective relationships will usually entail a longer term relationship with a USACE civilian employee. General officers in HQUSACE are usually assigned for three to five years. The primary role of the Chief of Engineers must be to maintain effective and close personal relationships at the Washington level.
- Interaction at the National level usually involves non-traditional, special considerations outside the scope of established policy and guidance. In effect, it typically requires the establishment of new policy that requires careful legal and jurisdictional considerations.



- The effectiveness of National Interface depends on how well HQUSACE leaders listen, learn, and responsively adapt to what it requires to help stakeholders succeed.

### **Regional Interface (Strategic Relationships)**

More and more, governmental agencies are relying on a regional approach to accomplish work. Most Federal agencies have regional offices which act as extensions of their headquarters in Washington, DC for purposes of overseeing activities in a given geographic area. The Departments of Energy (Power Administrations), Interior (Fish & Wildlife Service, Geologic Service, Park Service), Agriculture (Conservation Service, Forest Service), Transportation (Highway Administration), National Marine Fisheries Service, Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the Environmental Protection Agency all operate regional offices which interact regularly with the Corps of Engineers in the accomplishment of Civil Works activities. This is logical given the breadth of responsibilities and the insurmountable challenges faced by trying to manage activities out of a single location in Washington, DC.

The Department of the Army consolidated its human resources activities into regional Civilian Personnel Centers (CPOCs), and Regional Support Commands to administer programs for the Army Reserve. More recently, the Army established Regional Installation Management offices that will integrate installation management activities for Army Posts in their geographic area of responsibility and Contracting Centers to consolidate all contracting activities in a geographic area. In the past, the Air Force used Regional Civil Engineer offices to administer design and construction programs before placing that responsibility with Major Commands (MAJCOMs).

And the Corps of Engineers has Regional Business Centers operating out of Major Subordinate Commands (eight Divisions commanded by general officers) dispersed throughout CONUS and Hawaii.

One challenge associated with all these regional operations is that the geographic boundaries of all regional Federal offices do not align exactly with one another. Each agency has a somewhat different geographic boundary based on some particular condition (USACE is based on watersheds, EPA and FEMA on standard Federal regions). But, the trend for management of programs has been that regional partners interact to resolve issues that may have otherwise been referred to Washington for resolution, and oftentimes there are overlapping regional relationships. Likewise, regional offices act as extensions of a corresponding headquarters in Washington, DC.

Notwithstanding the complexities associated with the inconsistency in boundaries, regional interface is a key component in effective mission accomplishment. Generally, regions are established based on unique characteristics that define the area. Similar conditions (climatic, topographic, environmental) create similar challenges that call for synergistic solutions. The best way to approach these solutions is on a regional basis.



A good example of an effectively working regional approach is in the South Eastern United States where the South East Natural Resource Leaders Group regularly meets to address environmental and natural resource issues impacting the region. The body is made up of regional directors of Federal agencies in the South East who meet to develop strategies and identify specific actions to fully integrate a set of Guiding Principles into agency cultures at all levels throughout the region. Typically an agenda would include the opportunity to share concerns, identify common challenges and work to resolve specific issues before they are referred to the Washington level. This is an excellent forum for Corps' strategic learning.

Another great example of effective regional interaction occurs in the North West Division where water and fish management is accomplished regionally by the Division Headquarters. Responsibilities are grounded in a treaty and Executive Order and encompass interaction with the government of Canada in addition to other US Federal agencies.

Regional offices of other Federal agencies are principle customers and strategic partners of virtually all USACE Divisions. Very clearly there is a regional interface role for the foreseeable future. It is equally evident that this trend will increase as resources continue to shrink, technology advances and agencies look for ways to operate more efficiently.

As the ideal corporate design for USACE is implemented, the following are important to regional interface:

- Regional partners must be actively engaged with USACE Division offices.
- Regional partner involvement in programs must be clearly understood.
- A primary role for the Division Commander includes interacting with regional partners.
- Regional interaction must facilitate mission accomplishment.
- There are increased opportunities for greater efficiency using a regional approach.
- Define how to improve customer care benefits through regional engagement.
- Take advantage of economies realized by a regional approach.
- Clearly identify which USACE office (District or Division) is best to provide regional interface?

## **Policy**

Webster's defines "policy" as:

- a. “A definite course or method of action selected from among alternatives and in light of given conditions to guide and determine present and future decisions.”
- b. “A high-level overall plan embracing the general goals and acceptable procedures especially of a governmental body.”

Policy is generally developed at any level of an organization where there is latitude to accomplish objectives from a variety of choices, and generally reflects the guidance of the leadership of the organizational unit. It may be grounded in law, and entail an interpretation of some aspect of law for purposes of clarification and guidance to other elements of the organization.

In the context within which USACE uses the term “policy,” it is implementing guidance, grounded in some higher authority, typically law, ie a WRDA Bill. But policy may entail a statement of preferred alternative when choosing among options, especially when addressing technical matters (such as options which conform to a building code). Within USACE, policy is promulgated in the form of Engineer Regulations, Engineer Pamphlets or Policy Letters.

It is important to remember that policy is a chosen course of action. It may be grounded in law, but it is guidance and not law. It may be modified by the element promulgating it, without approval or additional authority, as long as it remains consistent with the overarching legal source document but it should be generated at the highest possible level that will influence consistency over the range of activities impacted by the policy. This creates a challenge when different offices in USACE produce uncoordinated, conflicting policy on the same subject.

USACE defines a primary role of the Headquarters in Washington, DC to generate policy. This is particularly true in the water resources arena but is also applicable to the technical functions of engineering, construction or operations, and to support functions (Resource Management, Information Management, Legal, etc). A primary purpose of policy is to ensure consistency along a desirable course of action. Therefore, it is important that the policy be generated from the Headquarters (at least in the context with which it is being used here).

USACE also promulgates implementing policy based on the policy of its higher headquarters, the Department of the Army. And the USACE staff is regularly engaged in coordination of policy issues with the Army staff.

When completing projects, an interesting inconsistency in USACE process is that for most water resource related document reviews we specify a policy check at the MSC level (note this is a policy check for policy generated at the higher headquarters), and an additional check at the USACE Headquarters in Washington, DC. This double check introduces delays in the overall process, and at times, has resulted in divergent opinions regarding the desired course of action. The Witherspoon Report established the Divisions as extensions of HQUSACE so the review could possibly be done at that level.

A better approach would be to have them done at the Washington level to ensure consistency across the eight regional offices. Policy reviews are one area where improvements need to be made in the USACE project delivery process. An Office of Water Policy Review has been proposed and should be implemented at the Washington level.

Ideally, Districts, as the execution arm of USACE, would have all the needed skill, talent and ability to execute projects without any policy review by higher headquarters. But Districts develop projects in conjunction with local sponsors, and they do their best to satisfy sponsor objectives (customer care). Sponsor objectives may include features that are not specifically contained in authorizing legislation. The policy check is required to ensure that the project conforms to the law authorizing the project.

In the future, HQUSACE should continue to be the generator of policy which affects the quality of projects designed and constructed by USACE, and which implements requirements grounded in law, such as a WRDA Bill. Since clarification is often required which mandates interaction with lawmakers or higher headquarters to ensure compliance of a given policy with their intent, this interaction is best accomplished at HQUSACE.

The development of policy should also be an interactive planning process with the field (in this case the MSC, as the Regional Business Center), which should also interact with the Districts. This interactive process would bring the practical perspective to the policy being generated, basing it on practical experience associated with managing execution of the mission. And it would recognize regional factors so final policy is not overly restrictive given the unique conditions found in each of the MSC regions. In the manufacturing era it could be assumed that those at the top of hierarchies had the best view, but this was a time of standardized products. In today's knowledge and service based work, where products are co-produced with customers and customized to their needs and strategies, regional headquarters and front-line teams have more knowledge about customers than those distant from them.

The following are considerations when addressing "Policy" from a mission perspective:

- What documents require a policy check?
- Where should policy checks be accomplished with least impact to the mission?
- When developing policy how are regional factors best incorporated?
- The number of policy reviews should be minimized.

- How are lessons learned regarding impacts to mission accomplishment aggregated for purposes of revising policy when it is warranted?
- Which policies from different offices within HQUSACE are in conflict?
- Identify priority items for policy review and restrict reviews only to matters of policy (as opposed to alternatives development).

## **Quality Assurance**

ER 5-1-11 defines quality assurance as: “ An integrated system of management activities involving planning, implementation, assessment, reporting, and quality improvement to ensure that a process, item, or service is of the type and quality needed to meet project requirements defined in the PMP.”

For years the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has relied on construction contractors to perform quality control (QC) on construction work. The Corps’ field staff has a quality assurance role. The construction contractor is responsible for ensuring that construction is completed in accordance with the contract plans and specifications, and for coordinating requirements to produce a quality project. The quality is actually specified in the requirements detailed in the contract drawings and specifications. The contractor must put in place controls (checks, tests and reviews) to ensure that those requirements are satisfied. The Corps performs its quality assurance mission by first reviewing and approving the contractor’s plan for ensuring the quality of the project (Quality Control Plan), then during the course of construction, spot checking, first the contractor’s process, then the actual work, to gauge the success of the contractor’s commitment to produce the desired quality. In the 1950s and the 1960s the Corps of Engineers field staff actually did quality control. Corps’ field inspectors took concrete cylinders and tested them for strength in Corps’ labs, paint samples were tested through Corps laboratories for compliance with Federal and Military Standards, roofing materials were tested by Corps personnel for compliance with published standards. Transitioning to the contractor QC system involved significant cultural change, and for years Corps’ field staff had to adjust their way of doing business from QC to QA. Today, QC/QA is fully accepted throughout the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the transition is complete. Contractors and Corps field staff understand their responsibilities to work collaboratively to produce the desired level of quality.

With quality control of planning and design documents, the transition is not so complete. Historically, Corps’ Divisions performed a technical review function. Contract drawings were actually reviewed by technical personnel assigned to the Division Office (and to a lesser degree HQUSACE technical personnel) for technical adequacy. Planning reports were similarly reviewed at the Division and HQUSACE for appropriateness and the identification of alternatives. The Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors did a comprehensive critical evaluation of projects that was presented by Districts and Divisions for approval. In the early 1990s, the technical review function of the Divisions was eliminated, and the Witherspoon Report identified “Quality Assurance” as a mission of the Division office. The Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors was eliminated and the personnel in that organization were moved to

HQUSACE. Districts were charged with ensuring the quality of their work (Quality Control). They were assigned responsibility for developing a Quality Management Plan that would drive their quality control program. Technical adequacy of technical products would undergo “Independent Technical Review,” by either another Corps organization (other than the one developing the technical product), or an independent contractor. Division offices and HQUSACE were to perform a check for policy compliance. Unfortunately, little changed in practical application at the Division level with the Witherspoon Report. All too often, projects continued to undergo some level of review by Division technical personnel for their technical adequacy under the guise of a quality assurance check or policy review. Consider that the same people, who for years were doing technical reviews, were overnight transformed into policy compliance checkers. Their quality assurance role was never adequately defined. The result was delays in approval of technical documents that are forwarded to the Divisions and HQUSACE for a policy check, and feedback with suggested changes in approach as a result of what obviously are wholesale technical reviews. This is particularly evident in the review of planning documents. HQUSACE planners readily admit that it isn’t possible to perform their policy review without including a review of the technical aspects of what is being proposed and questioning why various alternatives were or were not considered and/or chosen. These delays and the resulting feedback from Divisions and HQUSACE have been a source of continuing frustration for District personnel and customers (particularly Civil Works local sponsors). This process has negatively impacted mission accomplishment as well as customer satisfaction. In other words, the process has delayed the timeliness the customer seeks, and should be redesigned to provide what the customer values.

The Witherspoon report also characterized the Divisions as extensions of HQUSACE. A logical extension of this characterization would be a single policy check of planning and design documents. This would move toward the ideal future design of USACE 2012 as an organization with less bureaucracy, which more effectively aligns with national stakeholders, including customers and agency partners. Presently, both the Division staff and HQUSACE staff review documents, particularly planning documents, for policy compliance. This imposes unnecessary delays in processing documents, adds to project delivery time, and undermines the shared value of customer focus. The check should be accomplished at the national versus regional level, and only at the national level, to ensure consistency across regional and District offices and not negatively impact execution.

The role of the Division staff should be:

- To first ensure that Districts have the necessary processes in place to ensure high quality projects (a District Quality Management Program). Quality is designed in from the start.
- To gauge the success of the District’s quality management program by first hand interaction with customers. This can be done by discussion, and supplemented by gap surveys, to assess their satisfaction with completed construction projects, the quality of the completed projects, and the performance of completed projects in accordance with their intended purpose.
- Ensuring PMPs contain QMPs.
- To assist quality assurance by making available high quality technical expertise to the region.

- Assist with the creation of “lessons learned.” Information should be shared across the region to District technical staffs, and, entered into the Learning Network web-based system (under construction 2003 for learning). The lessons learned function is something the Corps of Engineers has never done well. It is part of becoming a Learning Organization and the Division staff has a key role in validating the importance of learning from what works and what does not work, and facilitating the lessons learned process.
- Ensuring quality metrics are in place and regular feedback is provided to the Division Commander regarding project quality.
- Ensuring technical skills of PDT members and ITR team members are appropriate for the project being accomplished.
- Monitoring ITR processes and ensuring ITRs are independent.
- Minimizing the impact to mission accomplishment while still performing policy checks.

HQUSACE would be responsible for:

- Setting up the “Lessons Learned System.”
- Establishing a registry of technical skills.

A related issue entails those areas of expertise in which the Corps should be the recognized expert. We have heard time and again from stakeholders that the Corps’ credibility is tied to its expertise in such subjects as economics, cost estimating, hydrology, water resources and coastal planning. Practitioners belong in Districts to execute the work. But there is a need for world-class technical expertise in select areas at HQUSACE, particularly in these “credibility” areas, to respond to Washington level stakeholders and to act as team leaders in assembling technical experts from the field (including the labs) to prepare policy.

The Corps also has a very important responsibility to provide high quality budgetary information to the Administration and to the Congress. This responsibility requires certain technical skills that help define core competencies. The Corps needs to home in on those areas of expertise, *those things the Corps of Engineers does better than anyone else*, the “core” technical expertise that defines the Corps of Engineers, and concentrate to ensure it is the world’s preeminent expert in those areas. In addition, as we learn that other forms of expertise are required to address the systemic problems of our customers and other stakeholders we should either develop the needed competence, or partner with others who can provide it.

Resourcing constraints and declining workload prevent the Corps from maintaining the same level of technical capability in all its Districts. The notion of a Regional Business Center is built on the premise that what is important in a region is that high quality technical expertise exists somewhere in the region, and is available to all Districts in the region. Today’s technology enables dispersed teams to work together virtually. This means that all expertise does not have to exist within a geographically defined region. The Division has a responsibility to organize the region for success, ensuring that the highest possible technical capability is organized and utilized, no matter where they are resident, to be effective for the customer.



Projects are a reflection on the entire U.S. Army Corps of Engineers first, the region second, and the District third. The role of HQUSACE and Divisions is to help the Districts deliver the highest quality projects. In an ideal organization, the quality assurance program would:

- Leverage appropriate technical expertise throughout the Corps to deliver the highest quality projects.
- Ensure District Quality Control Programs and processes are working.
- Identify up front which technical documents really require a policy check, and where those checks should be accomplished?
- Establish core disciplines in which the Corps needs to be the technical expert vice contracting for that expertise.
- Ensure availability of technical expertise to Districts for execution of projects.

### Strategic Thinking and Planning

Strategic thinking and strategically developing the organization is a primary responsibility of headquarters (= HQUSACE + MSCs) leaders. This is defined more fully in the ideal future corporate design in this report. In 2002-2003 a great part of headquarters leaders work is operational. In the future, headquarters leaders will realize that thinking strategically, creating strategic dialogue among themselves and with stakeholders is real work, and must be what their daily agenda is all about. One of the goals achieved by creating the ideal future corporate design is to free headquarters managers and leaders to do strategic work.

Strategic planning needs to emerge from interactive collaboration with stakeholders between levels, and from across the organization. No one office can be responsible for strategic planning. It should result from a strategic dialogue among line executives. It does not come from the work of staff units though these units can help do research that assists executives. All senior leaders need to be involved in the strategic planning equation (either directly in open forum or through a designated representative, eg the Commander). The USACE Commander is ultimately the decision maker when it comes to strategic ideas, choices, and the strategic plan, which reflects his or her foresight and vision for the future. A commander's strategic plan should drive everything the organization does. It must be regularly refocused when new learning, changes in the larger environment, and innovations indicate a better choice. It should help subordinate commanders schedule their effort and be a guiding force for integrating and determining investments of scarce funds and initiatives designed to shape the future. USACE has struggled to create a strategic planning process.

The current attempt at strategic planning involves a Commander's Planning Group (CPG) located in HQUSACE which is staffed with personnel who act as facilitators. They do not do strategic planning per se nor do they operate in a vacuum. *The senior leadership of the organization, the entire organization, actually must do strategic planning.* Today there is no regularly scheduled forum for strategic dialogue. Instead, mission related, operational issues marginalize the discussion of strategic matters on a regular basis. The Corps created a "Command Council" to promote discussion of strategic issues. But, to date, most discussion at the Command Council has been in the form of downloading status reports and "data dumps," or briefings related to mission accomplishment, and not strategically focused (one notable exception was a meeting at



which each MSC Commander was required to present initiatives underway in their region for discussion with the rest of the command).

The Corps has also created an Issues Management Board, where Senior Executive Service (SES) members and general officers assigned to Corps Headquarters meet to discuss issues. Again, in practice, the focus is more on operational matters related to mission accomplishment instead of strategic planning. And the IMB does not include senior leaders from the MSCs (SESs or general officers). The Corps tried a Strategic Management Review forum to address strategic planning issues, but it never gained momentum or reached its full potential. A forum where dialogue on strategic issues is encouraged and demanded would help. The Command Council could also serve that function. But the experience of having brought into existence a CPG, a Command Council, an IMB indicates that *creating new structures like these does not create strategic thinking and planning.*

General Electric under Jack Welch used a unique approach to strategic planning in which the CEO gathered his subsidiary “mini-CEOs” and had a free flowing dialogue about what was happening and what should happen in the future. Each subsidiary contributed ideas based on what was going on (mission accomplishment) in their business. This was done regularly in intense sessions that were focused and led by a strategic thinker who saw himself as continually learning as well as educating. He drove his subordinate leaders to do the same. USACE should learn from the GE example, and stop investing false hopes in processes and structures that only waste executives’ time and produce no strategic thinking or dialogue.

The strategic planning process is further complicated by the dominant style of leadership in that USACE senior leaders are Army general officers and SESs, who typically have an operational focus on mission accomplishment. Military officers who attain the rank of General are high performing leaders who represent the best talent in the Army. They were promoted to flag rank because they possess extraordinary abilities and demonstrated success serving in a variety of assignments at a variety of levels including success commanding troops at the Battalion and/or Brigade level. They serve as commanders in USACE for one to four years, until they move to HQUSACE or some other Army general officer assignment. And they typically value success, as do most military officers, on mission accomplishment in the near term. Oftentimes, new general officer commanders have never served in USACE (the Major Army Command) before. This creates the requirement for a spin-up period during which the commander will become familiar with USACE and its missions. During this spin-up period it is very difficult for the commander to make meaningful contributions to USACE strategic thinking and planning.

Civilian members of the SES also attained their position through demonstrated excellence serving in a variety of positions at different levels inside and outside USACE. They too possess unique leadership abilities. But oftentimes, their success was gauged by mission accomplishment, operational success as opposed to dealing with strategic issues.

USACE seems to have expected that creating structures is sufficient for strategic planning, but the evidence indicates that strategic planning is still not getting done. Most of what is done, even when labeled “strategic” is operational planning. Division and District Commanders have a role to play in crafting the strategic vision, as do members of the Senior Executive Service. Their experiences accomplishing the mission are essential to shaping the strategic objectives for the organization but their focus needs to be on the strategic, not operational.

Another element in USACE that has a role in supporting the strategic planning process by making a research contribution is the Institute for Water Resources (IWR). They are “deep

thinkers” on water resource issues and need to be generally recognized as world-class experts. In recent years, funding constraints and stresses created on the HQUSACE organization, have refocused IWR away from strategic issues to more operational issues. Their strategic planning role is essential to the health and credibility of the organization and should be reconstituted and encouraged.

The latitude for meaningful strategic planning contributions is probably more evident in the Civil Works arena than the Military Construction Program where USACE is an executor of strategic planning done at the Army Staff level. Even so, USACE should look for opportunities to contribute to the Army strategic planning effort either through the Office of the Chief of Engineers in the Pentagon, or the Chief of Engineers who sits on the Army Staff.

From a mission perspective, as the ideal future corporate design is implemented, USACE needs to consider the following with regard to its strategic planning:

- Strategic planning must consider presently assigned missions, the operational environment and how it could impact those missions, potential future missions, and compatibility of the strategic vision with the organization’s capabilities and core competencies.
- Strategic planning requires understanding the dynamic forces changing the social, political, and economic considerations, new scientific knowledge, innovations, and the changing needs and strategies of stakeholders. This requires foresight and continuous learning, including learning from stakeholders, best practices, and learning cases of Corps’ practices.
- Strategic planning must emerge from regular interactions between HQUSACE and MSCs which also have interactions with Districts.
- An interactive planning process and meeting culture needs to be created. The style of leadership for HQUSACE leaders must be clearly defined in terms of strategic thinking and behavior. These changes involve all strategic levels throughout the organization. The focus is how to align all aspects of the culture (the 7 Ss) with the ideal future, so everything the Corps does moves toward the future.
- Who should be engaged in the strategic planning process needs to be clear. The process should be regular and inclusive. The strategic process is a major focus of all HQs offices.
- The purpose and definition of strategic planning has to be clarified and shared by headquarters leaders. Leaders must agree to the answer of the question: strategic planning for what? Recognizing that the Corps is not a business, but a governmental agency, do the leaders agree that the purpose of strategic planning is to make the Corps a lean, flexible, responsive organization that quickly adapts to the changing needs of principle stakeholders? In other

words, how to be an organization that continually learns how to increase effectiveness.

- There needs to be a repository for research, ideas and factors to facilitate the organization's strategic plan and ongoing strategic process. That repository is rightly located at HQUSACE.
- USACE's strategic thinking and planning must contribute to and align with Army strategic planning.

### **Regional Business Center (RBC) 2012**

Notwithstanding the assigned missions of Command and Control, Program Management, Regional Interface and Quality Assurance, the primary mission of the Divisions is and should be to operate the Regional Business Center. The term "Regional Business Center" refers to a concept of operation, a way of doing business, which concentrates on delivering projects efficiently (doing things right) and effectively (doing the right things) by leveraging the total available resources across a region.

It is helpful to put the Regional Business Center concept into historical context by briefly reviewing the evolution of the Corps structure over the past 200 years and contrasting that with the evolution of the private sector Architect-Engineering-Construction (AEC) industry. As Army Corps of Engineers geographical district headquarters developed across the United States in the early 19<sup>th</sup> Century, their organization and processes reflected their era of great distances and limited communication and transportation connections. They were, by today's standards, quite isolated and local commanders required a full suite of expertise to execute their mission. These early Corps Districts, entirely consistent with military doctrine of the day, were highly decentralized and independent. Most private firms operated in a similar fashion since they too were constrained by the same limited communications and transportation systems.

As communication and transportation systems improved, many industries, most notably heavy industries such as automobile manufacturing and steel, consolidated their operations. This trend accelerated significantly during and following the Second World War. However, with the exception of a handful of large international construction firms, the U.S. Architect-Engineer-Construction (A-E-C) industry continued to operate with local offices of large firms acting as independent "profit centers" (similar to Corps Districts) with each office maintaining a large suite of expertise and in direct competition with other offices of the same firm, as well as other firms. For example, the Denver office of Firm X would compete with Firm X offices in Seattle and Los Angeles, as well as a dozen other firms, for work in Salt Lake City. This trend continued into the 1960s when U.S. A-E-C firms started developing integrated teams, pulling together their best and most competitive assets, regardless of where they sat. This changed the profit center for these firms to a regional or, in many cases, corporate level. Firms following this integrated approach very quickly began to dominate the market as a result of the high quality and low costs that they were able to achieve.

Following this initial trend was a movement across the A-E-C industry to regionalize or centralize design into “centers of excellence” whereby a relatively high, consistent volume of interesting and challenging work allowed firms to significantly reduce overhead costs, eliminate redundancy, and, attract, retain and train a high quality workforce. This latter trend proved to be particularly challenging; the issue was how to provide high quality, low cost deliverables, while remaining close and responsive to the client. Those firms who successfully met that challenge survived; those who did not either went out of business or were taken over.

Throughout this period of revolutionary change in the A-E-C industry, the Army Corps of Engineers, the world’s premier public engineering organization, remained immune to these changes and continued to operate as it had in the early 19<sup>th</sup> Century. It did so despite the increasing demands of its customers and stakeholders that it operate as a “best in class” business, effectively utilizing lessons learned from the private sector and leveraging 20<sup>th</sup> Century technology and systems. The rest of the Army, meanwhile, had dramatically modified its doctrine for the new age and no longer allowed commanders at the brigade level to maintain an entire suite of expertise integral to their units - they are forced to draw upon centralized support, not unlike the A-E-C industry’s “centers of excellence.”

In the late 1990s, USACE leaders decided that the Corps should move from 41 independent “business units” to eight regional business centers organized around existing Divisions. This marked a huge shift in the culture, organization and processes of the Corps.

The Regional Business Center is not a physical unit, a geographical location, a body/organization of people, or a block on an organizational chart. The Regional Business Center is a concept used to describe a way of doing business that grew out of a continuing period of declining workload and resources and improvements in transportation and telecommunications. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers can no longer afford forty-one full service Districts that look the same and possess the same level of technical capability. The workload assigned to many of the Districts simply will not support “full service” capability. Coupled with the political mandate to not close any District offices it is apparent that a new way of doing business is needed as the Corps enters the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.

The Regional Business Center is characterized by utilization of the Project Management Business Process as the basic business process. Districts share experiences and build trust through collaborative relationships. Workload is shared, so the best talent is devoted to an issue. It is not so important who is assigned the work by virtue of an assigned mission or geographical location, as it is that the best talent in the Corps of Engineers is brought to bear to accomplish the mission. Delivery of high quality projects on time and within budget to a delighted customer is of paramount importance. Relationships are fundamentally important and the primary responsibility for maintaining an effective trust-based relationship with the customer is vested in the project manager. Learning opportunities are maximized through formal training, mentoring, partnering with other Federal agencies, professional organizations, universities and the private sector, and

most importantly, experiences, good and bad, are shared with counterparts across the region (and throughout USACE).

Customers benefit from this new way of doing business because it provides access to a broader range of high quality talent, resulting in better quality products and services delivered more consistently. Customer care is improved through streamlined operations (“One Door to the Corps”), simplified operating procedures (greater ease of doing business), lower costs, improved efficiencies, and greater responsiveness.

Corps employees also benefit. By leveraging resources to meet fluctuating peaks and valleys in workload, employees enjoy more stability. They have the opportunity to work on a broader variety of work assignments, providing more challenging opportunities. Jobs are no longer location specific, collaboration and cooperation increase individual skills and expertise, enhancing technical capability. Training, development and learning opportunities are significantly enhanced. By becoming part of the larger team, individuals benefit from the experiences of counterparts located elsewhere in the region. Professional growth opportunities are enhanced, as is job satisfaction.

Finally, to USACE itself, a regional approach lowers the overall cost of doing business, delivers higher quality products and projects quicker and more efficiently, and makes the Corps of Engineers the preferred source of design and construction services for other Federal agencies. Leveraging resources to accomplish a regional mission facilitates the learning process across regions providing for a better Corps of Engineers. Technical capability centers, concentrated in a few Districts, enhance technical collaboration throughout USACE. Improved technology transfer leads to state-of-the-art expertise guaranteeing high quality projects and customer satisfaction. Forward deployed project managers bring the technology to bear on assigned projects.

The arguments for a regional approach to mission execution are compelling. Notwithstanding the benefits and sound reasons to operate as a Regional Business Center, cultural barriers stand in the way. First and foremost among the barriers is loyalty to the District as opposed to the region. Traditionally, Districts succeeded by what they accomplished within their boundaries, with their organic resources. Similarly, the success of commanders and senior leaders was based on individual accomplishment within their respective organizations. USACE performance indicators and measures of success have focused on the District as the operating unit as opposed to the region, creating a reluctance to rely on capability outside the District to accomplish the mission. In addition, these metrics create an atmosphere of competition between Districts as opposed to collaboration to accomplish a greater mission. Employees operate in a comfort zone centered on the District. Anything else is viewed as a threat to job security. Control creates comfort--that which you control is preferred to that which is under the control of others. There also is the natural resistance to change and fear of the unknown.

Oftentimes, regionalization and regional operations are viewed in the context of winners and losers. The Regional Business Center is not about District “X” and District “Y.” It is not about giving something up or gaining something. It is about the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers delivering high quality products and projects and organizing itself in the

most efficient manner in a resource constrained environment. USACE will have succeeded in implementing the concept when employees stop identifying themselves as working for District “X” or District “Y,” and instead identify themselves as working for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in location “X” or “Y.”

Senior leaders must become rabid advocates for this vision of the future. They must communicate the benefits of operating as a Regional Business Center to District employees, and look for opportunities to employ a regional approach. Immediate changes to the manner in which we measure success and gauge success for employees in the District will facilitate the cultural change needed to adopt this new way of doing business. Regional leadership development initiatives, regional technical experts and regional points of contact for key customers all enhance the Regional Business Center concept. Collaboration and cooperation must be rewarded before individual achievement. The vision must be understood and embraced throughout the Corps in order to produce the necessary change.

The Command Planning Group under the management and supervision of the USACE Process Committee has published a predecisional paper that examines the operational environment in the year 2012. The paper is a product of the work performed by the Regional Business Center (RBC) 2012 Study Product Delivery Team sponsored by the USACE Process Committee. It describes the objective state of USACE RBCs, the current state of USACE RBCs and recommends steps to attain the objective state. What follows is the unedited version of the paper dated 24 March 2003.



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# **USACE Regional Business Center (RBC) 2012—The Objective State**

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# **USACE RBC 2012: The Objective State**

**Prepared By  
Command Planning Group (CEPG)  
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**24 March 2003**

## **PREFACE**

This paper, published by the Command Planning Group (CPG), is part of an annual series of occasional papers. The CPG occasional paper series is designed to meet several criteria:

- Focus on topics that are of USACE strategic corporate interest.
- Examine USACE key issues or challenges of concern to the leadership and the Command at large.
- Provide a discussion or dialogue framework for documentation of a study or team project.
- Offer a tool for in-depth discussion in contrast to a shorter issue or white paper.

As mentioned, the occasional paper series can be used to explore an in-depth examination of an issue or challenge facing USACE. The occasional paper series can also be used to examine various aspects of a particular theme. For example, the occasional paper series could be used as a venue for discussion on the challenges of supporting the Department of Homeland Defense or Army Transformation.

This CPG paper examines part of the operational environment that USACE is expected to face in the year 2012. The paper is a product of the work performed by the Regional Business Center (RBC) 2012 Study Product Delivery Team (PDT). The USACE Process Committee sponsored the RBC 2012 study project.

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This paper assists the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) in defining and advancing the state of its regional business centers (RBCs) by examining three essential elements of analysis:

- What is the current state of USACE RBCs?
- What is the objective state of USACE RBCs?
- What are the recommended steps that the Corps can take to advance to the objective state?

This paper is produced under the management and supervision of the USACE Process Committee (ProCom). The ProCom is chartered with management and oversight of the implementation of the USACE Vision Goal—Use PMBP to Operate as One Corp Regionally Delivering Products and Services. The co-chairs of this committee are Mr. Joe Tyler and Mr. Rob Vining. The USACE Regional Business Center (RBC) 2012—The Objective State is referred to as “RBC 2012” hereafter.

The RBC 2012 Project Delivery Team (PDT) took an all-sources approach to answering the three key essential elements of analysis. The PDT integrated and synthesized the following informational sources to reach final recommendations and observations: RBC 2012 workshop proceedings, RBC 2012 Survey, PDT insights, USACE studies and reports, USACE 2012 Snapshot, and field interviews.

Eight significant conclusions and recommendations have been provided to the USACE Process Committee for their review, coordination with the Stockton Study team efforts, and consideration by the HQUSACE Issues Management Board (IMB) and USACE Command Council. They are:

**Conclusion 1:** MSCs have been active and successful in conducting initial RBC initiatives.

**Recommendation 1:** Plan for continued success using Learning Organization concepts.

**Conclusion 2:** The current state, objective state, metrics, and milestones of RBCs have not been defined or implemented—from a corporate perspective.

**Recommendation 2:** Use USACE RBC 2012 PDT findings as launching point for MSC RBC advancement.

**Conclusion 3:** The RBC has not been well communicated, nor is it well understood by USACE.

**Recommendation 3:** Implement USACE RBC Communication Strategy.

**Conclusion 4:** Turf and aversion to sharing are the greatest barriers to RBC success.

**Recommendation 4:** Change culture from competitive to collaborative.

**Conclusion 5:** USACE (HQ and MSCs) has not adequately conducted, communicated, and implemented an integrated regional business center strategic plan (5-7 year outlook).

**Recommendation 5:** Collaborate and integrate MSC strategic planning initiatives toward Regional RBC 2012 efforts that define the “who, what, when, where, why, and how” of future work.

**Conclusion 6:** The RBC concept will not be fully effective until MSCs have the capability to manage and monitor resources.

**Recommendation 6:** Implement a strategic plan at each MSC based on concepts developed at the MSC Strategic Planning Forum (recommendation #5) in FY03.

**Conclusion 7:** PMBP is focus for success; RBC is not an explicit centerpiece to PMBP at this time.

**Recommendation 7:** Phase-in/move RBC forward into spotlight of PMBP stage at Senior Leaders Conference (SLC) 2003.

**Conclusion 8:** Regional Business Center management requires the right information, at the right time, to more effectively and efficiently perform its responsibilities to ensure project execution within the region to meet results-based management goals. This is not occurring.

**Recommendation 8:** Model and implement actions that will level IT as a business management activity enabler.

USACE 2012 snapshot, a picture of the Corps operating environment in 2012, produced the following mission area observations: water resource issues reach critical mass; environmental programs and awareness grow in importance and are linked to global networks; infrastructure needs of the nation grow—particularly for Homeland Defense; NBC, demographics, and greenhouse exacerbate effects of disasters; USACE capability is a vital part of the Army team.

The USACE 2012 snapshot also revealed several campaign plan observations: people--expect smaller, highly talented, flexible workforce; process--improvements contingent on IT and globalization use; communication--effective relationships and partnerships are key; budget--factors indicate little-to-zero growth pattern.

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## I. INTRODUCTION

**PURPOSE.** This paper helps USACE to define and advance the state of its regional business centers (RBCs ).

**SCOPE.** This paper:

Examines the current state of Regional Business Centers (RBCs) [where the Corps is today (Dec 2002)].

Examines the RBC objective state [where the Corps wants to be in 2012].

Examines the barriers and bridges to achieving the RBC objective state [how does the Corps get there] .

**PROJECT SPONSOR.** This paper is being produced under the management and supervision of the USACE Process Committee. The co-chairs of this committee are Mr. Joe Tyler and Mr. Rob Vining. The USACE Regional Business Center (RBC) 2012--The Objective State is referred to as "RBC 2012" hereafter.

**BACKGROUND.** This paper supports the implementation of the USACE Vision and Campaign Plan. More specifically, it supports the USACE Process Committee, which provides management support to the USACE process goal: "use PMBP to operate as One Corps regionally delivering quality good and services." This study report, USACE Regional Business Center (RBC) 2012—The Objective State, represents the culmination of activities in support of Action 2a of the USACE Process Committee: "enable full implementation of RBC thru management and oversight of the RBC 2012 Study Project." The Process Committee's charter is to provide corporate implementation support for achieving the Process goal contained in the USACE Vision. The RBC PDT is comprised of 12 members from USACE major subordinate commands, centers, and headquarters. The team worked together to gather, process, and finalize information on RBC 2012. CPG acted as the project manager for the publication of this paper.

**ORGANIZATION.** This paper is organized into three major sections.

a. **Section I: Introduction.** The introductory portion of this paper provides the reader with background and other related information to provide an adequate contextual setting.

b. **Section II: Discussion.** The discussion section of this paper provides insights and analysis supporting the recommendations in the final section of this paper.


c. **Section III: Findings.** This section provides summary conclusions, recommendations, and observations.

**DEFINITIONS.**

a. **Regional Business Center.** The Regional Business Center (RBC) is a regional operating model that most efficiently (doing things right) and effectively (doing the right things) meets customer needs by leveraging total resources of the region--and the Corps--when needed (see paragraph 11 for a more detailed treatment).

b. **USACE RBC 2012.** USACE RBC 2012 represents a future notional operational state or condition. USACE RBC 2012 represents an “objective state” in which the Corps is operating regionally in an efficient and effective manner to serve customers.

**APPROACH.** The PDT’s overall analysis approach in this paper is seen in Figure 1 below.



**Figure 1. USACE RBC 2012 APPROACH**



The RBC 2012 PDT determined analysis was needed to effectively develop the RBC objective state. However, time constraints, budget, and the team's "home station" workload limited a full-time intensive analytic approach. The PDT followed a two-step approach:

a. **Conduct All Source Analysis.** The PDT examined six major sources of information as a foundation for the discussion in Section II of this paper, as seen in Figure 1 above. The PDT reviewed various USACE reports and publications such as the recent May 2000 USACE Engineer IG Report on RBCs, and older documents such as the Witherspoon Report. The PDT also conducted personal interviews and used an electronic survey to obtain insights from the field. Additionally, the PDT conducted a workshop at the 2002 USACE PDT Conference to gather other Corps-wide perspectives. The PDT provided its own perspectives to a USACE 2012 Snapshot [a picture of the Corps operating environment in 2012] to complete its data collection and analysis.

b. **Synthesis and Presentation.** The second part of the approach synthesized the information gathered in the all-source analysis. The PDT reviewed, synthesized, and compiled the findings through a series of virtual and on-site meetings. The study sponsor was provided with in-progress reviews during the two-step approach.

**ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF ANALYSIS (EEAs).** This paper uses three EEAs to focus the team's analysis of the USACE Regional Business Environment in the year 2012.

- a. What is the current [Dec 2002] state of the USACE Regional Business Centers?
- b. What is the USACE Regional Business Center objective state [2012]?
- c. What are the steps that must be taken to achieve that objective state?

**ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS.** This paper uses several key assumptions.

a. The Army will exist in the year 2012, USACE is a valued member of the Army team, the United States remains the world's superpower in the year 2012.

b. A "sketch" or "snapshot" of the future USACE operational environment in 2012 is determined by the RBC 2012 PDT and used to support its analysis.

c. The PDT's effort is linked to USACE 2012 effort; recognizes valuable lessons of prior organization studies such as the Witherspoon Report.

d. PDT leaned heavily upon existing RBC analytic efforts such as the SAD RBC 2012, the LRD RBC 2012, SPD's RBC Spider Web Slide, and POD's RBC Battle Rhythm Concept.

- e. Information cut-off date for this paper is 15 December 2002.

f. Elements of a USACE global operational environment are embedded in regional business center concepts.

g. This is a summary-level presentation of the RBC 2012 PDT analysis and findings; it is not comprehensive.

h. Definitions seen in paragraph six are used for the purposes of this paper.

i. USACE uses regional business centers, specialized FOAs, laboratories and centers of expertise, and partners/contractors where needed as contributing organizational structures.

j. USACE remains a Major Command within the Army structure.

k. PMBP continues as the nucleus of all business processes leading to the 2012 environment.

## II. DISCUSSION

**INTRODUCTION.** With regard to the Vision and Campaign Plan, a key question often asked by LTG Flowers, 50th Commander of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, is “are we making progress towards our Vision goals and objectives.” If so, “what are the milestones and metrics” that enables us to track our progress? The intent of this paper is to answer the question “are we making any real progress towards regionally delivering quality good and services?” LTG Flowers has stated his intent—“transition to the RBC as our primary operating unit.” This paper serves as a tool to help achieve that goal.

**WHAT IS AN RBC?** Our research found many definitions of the USACE Regional Business Center being used throughout the Corps. Currently, there is no standard (this paper uses the RBC definition in paragraph 6). SAD defines the RBC as a concept of operation, which most efficiently (doing things right) and effectively (doing the right things) meets customer needs by leveraging total resources of the region. SPD’s RBC represents an integrated and strategically focused approach to customer service and mission execution. Utilizing the RBC concept, SPD will employ a corporate approach to efficiently and effectively manage available resources. NWD defines the RBC, but a little differently than the other MSCs. POD does not agree with the use of “RBC” and “concept” in the same sentence. They believe it has moved from a concept to reality. Many agree on what the RBC is not: a physical unit, a geographical location, a body or organization of people, or a block on an organizational chart. The PDT synthesized the information collected on RBC definitions that resulted in the following RBC definition clarification.


**RBC Purpose.** The purpose of a RBC is to operate most efficiently (doing things right) and effectively (doing the right things) to meet customer needs by leveraging total resources of the region--and the Corps--when needed.

**RBC Central Components.** In most cases the RBC consists of the following components: Regional HQ (RHQ), District Commands (DC), RMB (also includes regional teams, committees, boards, etc.), Council of Commanders or Board of Directors/Trustees, Outreach to ERDC, CXs, MSCs . Of course the components may vary from region to region, however, these are found to be the most common components.

**RBC Characteristics.** A distinctive adjective called “ilities” can be used to describe key characteristics. They are: ability, flexibility, capability, affordability, executability, interoperability, scalability, sharability.

**RBC Mission.** This study found that there are four central mission of the RBC objective state. They include: regional business management; strategic communications and regional relationship management; regional strategic planning and initiative leadership; regional business center process support. Each of these mission areas can be broken into four to five key functions. Further discussion of these mission areas to the function level can be provided upon request.

**RBC Visualization Graphic.** The following is offered as a graphic that helps to enhance understanding of an RBC.



**WHAT ARE THE BENEFITS?** The benefits of the RBC to the Corps are many. Most agree on at least four significant benefits that are of value to the customer, the Corps, and the nation. First, it is seen that RBCs will enable the Corps to become better stewards of public funds by lowering the cost of doing business and becoming more affordable. Second, from the customer's perspective, the RBC is a tool for more efficient and effective product-and-service delivery by providing more consistent quality and access to a broader range of services to the customer. A third benefit, one of significance to the nation, is to enhance the ability of the Corps to address complex regional problems. Specifically, it is seen that more care for regional customers and issues such as watershed management will be realized. Finally, the RBC provides a more stable work environment for the Army and the Nation. RBCs allow a broader base of support to execute work and minimize the effects of downsizing. Additionally, RBCs ensure that competencies to meet our nation's future needs can be maintained regionally when it is not cost effective to do so at the district level.

**RBC EARLY CONCEPTS.** The Regional Business Center is not a new concept for the Corps. Some may argue, but closer examination reveals many forerunner concepts were in use in the early and mid-nineties. These include POD's operating division organizational setup, the SAD Regional Village initiative, NAD's use of the Regional Steering Committee, and the SWD Work Resources Management Board. In 1998, LTG Ballard established Regional Business Centers operating guidance throughout the Corps. Specifically, "I expect the MSCs to identify optimal business practices for the region, most efficient organizations for each district, and initiatives to optimize the use of regional resources." Subsequently, MSC HQ offices restructured. ERDC

reorganized the seven laboratories into a regional/global operating unit. ERDC's use of CEFMS as a regional financial management system stands today as a model for instituting regional operational techniques. The USACE Vision's Process goal reemphasized the Regional Business Center by stating "use the PMBP to operate as One Corps regionally delivering quality goods and services." The USACE Campaign Plan Process Objective 2, "One Corps, operating regionally and globally," further emphasizes by stating "the RMB is the key tool that enables the transition to the RBC as our primary operating unit."

**RBCs TODAY—THE CURRENT STATE.** An assessment of the current state of RBCs across the Corps was undertaken by the PDT. It was found that there are a number of superb regional initiatives that are in various stages of development across the Corps. Collectively these initiatives are characterized both from a textual and tabular form below. The current state is presented or framed from the recognized "people, process, and communication" typology. Other approaches to measuring the current state of RBC can be taken. However, the PDT did not reach a consensus on the frame of reference (regional financial management, regional contracts, regional MOUs, etc.) and metrics. Nor is the collection of information readily obtained to achieve a baseline of regional information. Again, the PDT found that a textual and tabular characterization is best used to present the current RBC state.

**a. RBCs Today--Textual Characterization: People**

District commands (DCs) exhibit limited shared work and collaboration; success still measured individually by DCs.

Limited use of PM forward concept.

Workforce planning in progress; linked to privatization and use of private sector.

DCs have core missions but not all DCs are full-service.

Limited use of alternate workplace.

METL being used to help focus training; limited training paths or requirements for some series; timeliness and funding of training often inadequate; individual, mission, and corporate requirements are competing for limited training funds.

Aging workforce with large scale retirements looming.

Strong identification with district; minimal recognition of regional issues.

Measures encourage district vice regional execution of projects.

**RBCs Today--Textual Characterization: Process**

- (1) DCs transitioning to some regional business practices.
- (2) Customers pay variable fees for comparable services.
- (3) District customer wants on the team; wants more quality.
- (4) DCs manage resources independently.
- (5) Increasing number of regional initiatives exist and are planned.
- (6) PMBP is being deployed.
- (7) Performance measures introduced; lagging indicators dominate.
- (8) RMB roles and responsibilities being formulated.
- (9) Lessons learned minimally integrated into process definition.

#### **RBCs Today—Textual Characterization: Communication**

- (1) Some organizational and functional barriers to commo still exist in regions.
- (2) PDTs composition no longer limited by DC boundary.
- (3) Signs of improved regional communications.
- (4) Ability to capture and share lessons learned inadequate.
- (5) DCs have relationships with their customers; limited knowledge management of Corps capability.
- (6) Limited knowledge of RBC concept throughout the Corps.
- (7) Coincidental coordination in Congress, stakeholders, and customers.
- (8) Workforce not fully aware of RMBs operation and their impacts and activities.

**RBCs Today—Tabular Characterization: Initiatives.** The figures below provide insight into some of the regional initiatives being conducted, planned, or underway currently (Summer, 2002). The information in the tables is organized by MSCs

(columns) and Vision Goal initiatives (rows). The alphabetic characters in each column represent the following:

O = ongoing initiative that is exclusive of Campaign Plan initiatives

P = initiative that is in the planning stage; not included in Campaign Plan

CP = an ongoing initiative that is part of the MSCs Campaign Plan

Complete = an initiative that has been completed

Source GROUP SUBGROUP	ERDC	LFD	MMD	NAD	NMD	POD	SAD	SFD	SMD
<b>PEOPLE</b>									
<b>LEARNING</b>									
Regional training & development	CP	CP/O	CP	CP	O	P	O	O	CP
ELP/LDP Programs	CP	O	O	CP	O	CP	CP	O	CP
METL Based IDPs		CP	O	P	CP	O	O	P	O
Recruitment & Retention Best Practices	CP	CP	CP		CP	CP/O	CP	O	CP
Knowledge Sharing/Learning Organization	CP	O	CP	CP	O	CP/O	CP	CP	CP
<b>COMPETENCY</b>									
Regional Recruitment & Retention	CP	CP	CP		CP	CP	CP	O	CP
Capable Workforce Plans	O	CP	CP	CP	O/CP	O	O	CP	CP
Regional Technical Experts (13s)		O			P	O	P	O	O
<b>SKILLS</b>									
RCS/Critical Skills DB	P	CP				P	O		
Regional Technical Skills Assessment	O	O				P	O		
Regional AAR				CP		O		CP	CP
<b>EVALUATION</b>									
Regional TAPES (focusing on corporate behavior)	O		CP			O	P		
Regional survey	CP		CP			P			CP
<b>PROCESS</b>									
<b>FINANCIAL</b>									
Common CERMS	O	CP/O							
Comparable Cost of Doing Business Targets	O	O				P	P		O
Regional CFI/Acquisition Strategy	O	CP/O			O	CP/O	O	CP	O
<b>BUSINESS</b>									
PMB/PP2	CP	CP	CP	O	CP/O	CP/O	CP	CP	CP
Map Regional Processes	O		CP			CP/O	O		CP
RBC Strategic Plan	O	O		O		P	O	O	CP
Regional CX		O			O	O			O
Metrics	P	CP/O	CP		O	CP/O	P	CP	CP/O
<b>WORKSHARING</b>									
Regional Workload AIS	O		CP	P		P		O	CP
Regional Work Priorities & Mgmt & Sharing	O	CP/O	P			O	O	CP	CP
MSC/MSC Partnering	O	O			O	O	O		
Regional Resource Sharing	O	O	P	O		O	O	CP	CP
<b>OPERATIONS</b>									
Roles, Responsibilities, Definitions,	O				O	CP/O			
Regional Quality	CP	CP	O		O	CP/O	O	O	CP

**Figure 2. RBC 2005 PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT CRITERIA  
(PEOPLE AND PROCESS) -- AS OF SUMMER 2002**

Source GROUP SUBGROUP	ERDC	LRD	MVD	NAD	NWD	POD	SAD	SPD	SWD
<b>COMMUNICATION</b>									
<b>INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY</b>									
Data Transfer Standards		O							P
Regional Shared Drive	P	O		O		O		P	P
Regional Communications	CP	CP			CP	CP / O	CP	CP	CP
IT Strategic Plan	O	O	CP			CP	O	O	O
Regional Website	CP	CP		CP	O	O		P	CP
Regional Backbone IT Infrastructure	O			O		CP			P
<b>RELATIONSHIPS</b>									
Regional Messages	CP				CP	CP	CP	O	CP
RBC Internal Knowledge Communications	CP	O			P	CP / O			O
Functional Boards	O	O	O		O		O	O	CP
PM Forwards w/ Customers		O		O	O	O	O	O	O
Regional Outreach & POC's	CP	O	O		O	O	P		CP
Regional Relationship Matrix	CP				O/CP	P		P	O
Strategic Alliances	CP				O			P	O
Regional Customer Feedback System	P	O	CP			CP		P	CP
<b>RESOURCES</b>									
BMO Staffing		O			Complete		O	O	O
CORPS Project Infrastructure Strategy									
Funding Strategies (Fed/non Fed)	O								

**Figure 3. RBC 2005 PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT CRITERIA  
(COMMUNICATION AND RESOURCES) -- AS OF SUMMER**

**2002**

**RBCs Today: Metrics.** USACE MSCs do not have a standard metric set for measuring progress towards operating regionally. Put another way, there is no standard corporate set of regional metrics that all MSCs are using to measure progress towards Vision Process Goal and Objectives. Some MSCs have taken steps towards



establishing metrics, yet the effort is uneven at this time. The following table represents some initial efforts toward measuring how we operate regionally.

<b>CAMPAIGN PLAN OBJECTIVE</b>	<b>METRICS</b>
One Corps, Operating Regionally And Globally	% of projects with independent technical review (ITR) employing staff from outside originating office (District/MSO).
	% of projects containing work executed efficiently outside organizational boundaries
	% of contracts with scope to operate across regional boundaries
	% of cross boundary work executed (cross districts; cross divisions)
	\$ of Regional Technical Specialists workload across region

**Figure 4. INITIAL REGIONAL METRICS**

**RBCs Today: Barriers.** RBC 2012 Project survey, workshop, and personal interviews indicated that five major groups of barriers prevented progress towards USACE using the regional business center as the primary business unit.

***Lack of Communication***

Poor internal communication of RBC intent; poor education of employees regarding RBC intent.

Lack of communication regarding RBC meetings and decisions.

Lack of knowledge of other districts' capabilities that can be used regionally; ability to capture a region's capabilities and share limited resources.

No comprehensive RBC plan that charts the path forward; no picture of objective state.

Poor public communication (no coordinated strategic messages) of RBC.

***Lack of Resources***

Lack of ability to invest in common IT systems, databases, infrastructure, policy and process that are enablers of Regional Processes.

Inadequate regional organizational resources for RBC support; no HQ proponency for RBC.

Uncoordinated Workforce Planning (loss of work; gaps in workforce) and assessment of impact of Fair Act.

Inadequate control of costs that can save the customer money.

***Lack of Culture Change***

Tribal behavior and parochialism (not-invented-here syndrome, rigid span of control, job security, lack of trust).

Adverse reaction to change; culture reinforces District Commander fiefdoms.

Corporate rigidity vs corporate flexibility.

Tactical and operational mindset vs strategic organizational mindset.

Get away from competition (we vs they) and move towards more collaboration with other Corps assets and customers.

Functional control of workforce and limited feedback from project teams for employees on teams.

***Lack of Process***

Existing metrics are not conducive to corporate behavior; what are the true measures—contracts?

Lack of knowledge of IT systems.

Little training in customer service.

Expertise wherever we can find it.

***Lack of Commitment and Support***

Leadership focus is on a plethora of initiatives; need to transition to focus on few—maintain fortitude.

Political implications and reality; little known on private sector buy in

Figure out now how we look for future need; uncertainty of future workload.

**RBCs TOMORROW—THE 2012 VISION.** Discussion of a future objective state should be centered on some “vision” of that 2012 state. This paper uses the following, extracted from the USACE 2012 study:

- a. Be respected and valued by the Army for its support to the war fighter
- Be trusted and respected by the Executive Branch, Congress, the media and the public
- Meet the Nation’s water resources needs efficiently, effectively, and economically while sustaining the environment
- Be led by a Headquarters organization that creates the conditions for success to meet the expectations of those we serve
- Spend more time working with stakeholders and less time managing the internal bureaucracy
- Be a preferred Federal employer with team members performing meaningful jobs in a smaller organization
- Have information systems that work seamlessly and reliably from any geographic location
- Use a web-based Learning network that provides best practices, e-learning, innovations, and regular dialogue for Communities of Practice.
- Have a reputation for doing what we say we will do
- Be led by strategic thinkers continually learning from customers and partners, other stakeholders, Federal and state agency partners, and from the organization’s experience of what works.

**RBCs TOMORROW—THE OBJECTIVE STATE.** Previous discussion has centered upon how the Corps is presently postured with regard to RBCs. Other discussion has been directed toward the barriers to the future objective state. Logic would insist that the following question be asked. “What does the RBC objective state look like?” This query is the focal point of the second essential element of analysis, and this paragraph. The PDT found that the RBC objective state is a difficult picture to paint. A map, chart, or blueprint cannot be laid out on a table to answer the question. Instead, the best that can be offered at this time is a table of conditions that represents the RBC 2012 objective state. The PDT compiled these conditions into the table seen on the next page.

PEOPLE	PROCESS	COMMUNICATION
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 21ST Century workforce operates regionally and virtually as the standard</li> <li>• Flexiplace is common; collaborative work environment is the norm</li> <li>• Matrix organization supports projects</li> <li>• Functional organizations train, educate and care for people</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Standard business practices are fully utilized throughout the region</li> <li>• PMBP is used for all work</li> <li>• Full service RBCs are maintained to address their assigned missions</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Regional PM Forwards are established with key customer; regional client relationships are well maintained</li> <li>• Communications are free-flowing throughout USACE; workforce knows RBC and is committed to it</li> <li>• Workforce understands RBC operations model</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Corporate/regional workforce planning and balancing occurs through a recurring strategic planning (SP) approach</li> <li>• RBC fully leverages private sector</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• RBC practices are standard throughout all RBCs</li> <li>• Promote regional acquisition strategies, processes, and planning</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Functional organizations communicate, coordinate, and operate as regional entities.</li> <li>• Regional strategic planning (SP) established and understood</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The composition of PDTs are defined by best USACE resources to meet customer needs</li> <li>• Greater vertical and lateral integration (organizational capabilities, resource sharing, technical expertise, project management, project delivery) is the rule</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Customers pay comparable fees for comparable services based on comparable costs of doing business</li> <li>• Cohesive synchronized approach to meeting customer needs and address their assigned missions</li> <li>• Service provider (district/ MSC) transparent to customer</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A full-service RBC exists utilizing the capabilities within the RBC and the Corps in which all RBC members are fully aware of what the Corps can provide and how to communicate the Corps' capabilities to all potential customers</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Centers of competencies are standard and used</li> <li>• Functional organizations operate as regional entities</li> <li>• Global market driven centers emerge</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Standard QM system used</li> <li>• AARs and lessons-learned fully utilized for process improvements</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Coordinated interface with Congress, stakeholders, and customers; regular gathering and analysis of customer feedback as a result of ongoing regional strategic plans</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• RBC is a learning organization that fosters innovation and systematically invests in education and skills development to effectively meet customer needs.</li> <li>• Prudent risk-taking encouraged; learn from mistakes and grow our knowledge</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• RBC metrics reward positive regional behavior</li> <li>• Success is defined by collaborative regional program execution and measured regionally on an intermittent basis</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A fully integrated enterprise IT architecture facilitates regional business processes across the USACE</li> <li>• Multi-district access to automated information system database</li> <li>• Districts fully leverage resources through collaborative management/data systems</li> </ul>

**Figure 5: THE RBC OBJECTIVE STATE**

### III. FINDINGS

**FINDINGS.** Discussion in Section II of this paper has focused on the current state of RBCs and the barriers to moving RBCs successfully to the objective state. What are the recommended steps that can be taken to reach the RBC objective state? This is the third essential element of analysis (EEA) that this paper addresses and the central theme of this section. The following discussion provides conclusions, recommendations, and observations that support this essential element of analysis (EEA).

**RBC 2012 Conclusions and Recommendations.** The following represent eight conclusions and recommendations offered by the PDT to the Process Committee.

#### *Share Success*

*Conclusion.* MSCs have been active and successful in conducting initial RBC initiatives; some include—

scattered use of regional functional boards and functional teams.

initial forays into regional service or skill centers.

designing and conducting regional training programs.

*Recommendation.* Plan for continued success using Learning Organization concepts including—

don't reinvent the wheel--share initiatives with other MSCs and Centers to reduce start-up costs on like initiatives.

one for all and all for one--MSCs collaborate, identify, develop, and implement common tools that can be used by all MSCs and centers.

spread the word--pool and share initiative successes at common existing venues and conferences on a semi-annual basis or monthly teleconferences.

reward and publicize regional innovation.

#### *Conduct Assessments*

*Conclusion.* MSCs RBC current state, objective state, metrics, and milestones have not been defined, implemented, or communicated--from a corporate perspective.

- i. Some MSCs have begun to examine the topic of assessing where they are and where they are going
- ii. Consensus is beginning to emerge on regional metrics and how to implement

*Recommendation.* Use USACE RBC 2012 PDT results (see below) as launching point for MSC RBC advancement to objective state.

Result 1--Use USACE RBC Current State (Assessment Matrix) as a tool for defining the baseline (figure 2 &3).

Result 2--Use USACE RBC 2012 Objective State [ment] as a strawman (figure 5).

Result 3--Use USACE regional metrics that are outcome oriented as a first step in establishing RBC progress (see figure 4).

### ***Advance Communications***

*Conclusion.* RBC has not been well communicated, nor is it well understood by USACE.

Many versions and interpretations of the RBC exist.

Common RBC lexicon is lacking.

Unclear proponentcy and policy at HQ level.

*Recommendation.* Implement USACE RBC communication strategy [or plan] that:

prepares the field for “next steps” of RBC implementation.

establishes active proponent for RBC within CEMP or CECW.

clearly defines what RBC is [see paragraph 6 of this report], why it's necessary, and where the Corps is going.

makes RBC an explicit part of 51st Chief's Vision and Campaign Plan Goal.

***Abate Parochialism***

*Conclusion.* Turf and aversion to sharing are is one of the greatest barriers to RBC success—

Surveys and interviews indicated parochialism is alive and well.

DEs unclear on measure of success—execute or execute through sharing.

Some civilian assets are not convinced of merits of RBC.

*Recommendation.* Change culture from competitive to collaborative –

Promote and implement PMBP curriculum.

Implement USACE RBC communication strategy (Recommendation #3).

Communicate RBC at USACE/MSD/DC SL strategic events.

Revise District Engineer course to explicitly include RBC as a learning objective.

Use regional metrics in CSI; transition CMR to RBC success.

Reinforce RBC behavior through regional performance standards and rewards and recognition for regional undertakings.

***Plan Strategically***

*Conclusion.* USACE (HQ and MSCs) has not adequately conducted, communicated, and implemented an integrated (national and regional) strategic plan (5-7 year outlook) that addresses—

Future needs of the nation.

What kind of work Corps will be doing.

How much work (\$) we will be doing.

What skills are needed and where will they come from.

Where are they located.

Gaps.

How to fill.

*Recommendation.* Collaborate and integrate HQ and MSC Strategic Planning initiatives that contribute toward “Regional RBC 2012” success, such as—

Share SAD, LRD, POD RBC 2012 efforts  
(workload/workforce/battle rhythm ).

Conduct HQ-MSC Strategic Planning forum that enhances  
MSCs efforts.

Initiate USACE 2012 Strategic Future “Snapshot” to aide  
regional efforts.

Revise/refresh SBSP and link to MSCs SP efforts.

### ***Manage Resources Regionally***

*Conclusion.* RBC will not be fully effective until MSCs have capability to manage and monitor resources from a regional perspective, specifically—

Who manages, allocates, and balances financial resources?

What are the shared missions that can be examined for  
efficiency?



What are the shared skills that can be identified and regionally shared?

Who will manage and monitor these regional efforts?

How will the information move effectively (see Recommendation #8)?

*Recommendation.* Implement Strategic Plan at each MSC based on concepts developed at the Strategic Planning Forum (recommendation #5) and USACE 2012 in FY03 that:

Regionalizes appropriate skill and mission sets that bring efficiencies and effectiveness for the customer.

Plans to continuously educate and train existing workforce to adapt to new needs to leverage their knowledge and skills—particularly customer service.

Predicts and manages workload 5-7 years out; plans human capital accordingly.

Manages financial resources of MSC through Corps automated systems.

Maintains adequately staffed and equipped BMO offices to facilitate this RBC success.

***Revise PMBP Objectives***

*Conclusion.* PMBP is locus for success; RBC is not an explicit centerpiece to PMBP at this time—currently the central items of focus are:

P2.

PMBP Curriculum.

PMBP Manual.

ER 5-1-11.

*Recommendation.* Phase-in and move RBC forward into spotlight of PMBP stage at the USACE SLC 03 for push in FY04.

Institute RBC as part of PMBP Program Manager's PMP.

Map regional business processes similar to POD effort;  
integrate into PMBP manual.

As P2 is implemented, make RBC an explicit objective in  
USACE and MSC Vision/Campaign Plans.

Makes RBC an explicit part of 51st Chief's Vision and  
Campaign Plan Goal (repeat action from  
recommendation #3: Commo).

***Determine Regional IT***

*Conclusion.* Regional Business Center management requires the  
right information, at the right time, to more effectively and  
efficiently perform its responsibilities to ensure project  
execution within the region to meet results-based management  
goals. This is not occurring.

*Recommendation.* Identify and establish a Corps RBC Business  
Reference Model and implement actions that will level IT as a  
business management activity enabler.

Redefine business processes, practices, and rules from a  
district level to a regional level as a precursor to  
leveraging IT to RBC 2012 business processes.

Enforce application of accounting standards so that each  
district has the same (not similar) cost in each standard  
CEFMS work item.

Migrate to regional management indicators (i.e., G&A,  
DOH, S&A, TLM) rather than district indicators.

Develop detailed requirement definitions and change  
specifications for corporate automated information  
system changes, interfaces, and integration  
requirements, including cost impacts on systems and  
the CEEIS infrastructure to support regionally defined  
business processes, practices, and rules.

Fund required application/systems/database changes to  
corporate information systems and the supporting IT  
infrastructure.

Design and implementation of a regional-based corporate database architecture; finance regionalized technology initiatives and functions.

Modernize and integrate web-based services delivery to most efficiently support Government-to-Citizen (G2C); Government-to-Business (G2B); Government-to-Government (G2G), core competencies, and learning organization objectives.

Seek line-item funding from both Military and Civil Works appropriations to finance the Corps technology and information systems that are part of the cost of doing business within the RBC.

**Observations.** There are a number of global and national trends that are influencing the way organizations will do business in the future. USACE is but one of several organizations that will change its normal operating procedures to adhere to the goals of the nation and the requirements of its people. These trends are forcing changes in mission priorities and surfacing new USACE missions for USACE to better serve our nation. The RBC 2012 PDT examined these trends and synthesized the data into a RBC 2012 “snapshot.” The following represent some key observations from that snapshot.

***Observations on USACE 2012 Missions.*** This segment of the paper uses the USACE Vision pamphlet spectrum of missions as an organizing protocol for observations on USACE 2012.

*Water Resources: issues reach critical mass by 2012.*

All components of domestic water resource equation (supply, quality, navigation, etc.) reach mainstream governance dialogue and action.

International water needs reach critical response phase; potential conflict over regional water issues.

*Environmental: programs and awareness grow in importance.*

Power of environmental advocacy groups grows domestically and internationally due to globalization and IT.

Increasing threats, challenge of cleanups, legislative mandates and public interest point to growing requirements domestically and internationally.

*Infrastructure: needs of the nation continue to grow; Homeland Security critical infrastructure protection needs dominate.*

H2O trans needs are critical to success of U.S. in global economy.

DOD infrastructure must accommodate new equipment to support transformation.

IT infrastructure is a new component to be accommodated.

*Disasters: demographics and greenhouse effects exacerbate effects; Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRNE) threat expands the spectrum.*

U.S. demographic growth plus older population migration to Western and Southeastern coastal zones increase response and recovery costs to nation.

International Disaster Response collaboration grows; developing countries saddled with debt cannot adequately respond and recover.

*War Fighting: capability of Corps continues to sustain its value to the Army team.*

WMD, environmental terrorism, water resource wars add to threat spectrum.

Post-conflict theater development and closeout lurks as potential new sustained mission.

***Observations on USACE Vision.*** The RBC 2012 PDT examined trends that included information outside of the USACE mission spectrum seen above. The following represent some key observations from that RBC 2012 “snapshot” that can be categorized using the USACE Vision pamphlet primary goals as an organizing protocol.

*People: expect smaller, highly talented, flexible workforces.*

Knowledge networks, AI, smart materials and technology, and advances in computing power replace some skills and needs.

Enhanced competition, Small Office/Home Office (SOHO) growth, growing private-sector capability, contingency workers grow by 50%.

Workforce is aging—yet is working longer due to health gains.

*Process: improvements contingent on IT and globalization use.*

Technology advances coupled with the growth of the global economy, facilitate companies easily shifting production around the world.

Services are the fastest growing sectors; services competing globally with speed and economy.

Specialization is spreading in industry and professions; endless niche markets; landscape of contingency workers.

*Communication: communicating through relationships and partnerships is key.*

“Devolution” from government to networks of varied organizations held together by electronic communication dominate.

Non-profit organizations will have more resource to expand their activities, power, and confrontations.

Effective governance will increasingly be determined by the ability and agility to form partnerships.

*Budget: factors indicate zero-to-negative real growth pattern over next 5-7 years.*

**NEXT STEPS.** A vital step in establishing successful next steps is to ask the question “How will the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers implement this strategy?” Once implemented, how does the Corps evaluate performance?

**Initial Review and Approval Process.** The following review and approval steps are anticipated by the RBC 2012 PDT:

***Early February 2003*** – Complete Concept Draft and circulate to RBC 2012 PDT members and Process Committee for comments; PDT return comments and suggestions to CEPG-R by mid-February 2003. RBC 2012 PDT members and Process Committee conduct coordination meeting with Stockton Study team for coordination and comments.

***Early March 2003*** – USACE HS PDT distributes RBC 2012 study paper for final review and comment by Process Committee; Process Committee uses document as source for discussion at 19-20 March Process Committee meeting.

***Mid March 2003*** – USACE Process Committee formulates USACE RBC 2012 report briefing for Issues Management Board (IMB) on Thursday, 27 March.

***End March 2003*** – USACE Process Committee briefs USACE RBC 2012 results to 27 March 2003 IMB for discussion and comment.

***End April 2003*** – USACE Process Committee briefs USACE Command Council on USACE RBC 2012 effort; IPR on USACE HS Strategic Plan.

***May-September 2003*** – Working to refine actions; coordinate and integrate with USACE 2012 implementation.

**Proponency and Communication.** USACE Process Committee has short-term (2d-3d Qtrs FY03) proponency for the USACE RBC 2012 Report. Long term RBC proponency to be determined by USACE Command Council.

**Evaluation.**

How are we doing in achieving the goals of the USACE RBC 2012 report? This is a question that must be asked once implementation has begun.

It is anticipated that an evaluation and revision of the recommendations of this paper will be considered on the one-year anniversary in April 2004 and advanced during the Command Staff Inspection process.

**LAST PAGE OF PAPER**

